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Abstract
To be concerned about data privacy in the fitness
tracking world is apparently not the question of age or
fitness level. It also does not necessarily influence the
actual use of fitness tracking technologies. In this
empirical study, 590 participants from the EU and USA,
who are current users, former users or non-users of
fitness tracking applications, were surveyed (online) on
their sensitivity perception of several data pieces
collected with fitness trackers as well as their data
privacy concerns. Furthermore, subgroups of different
fitness tracking users were detected based on their
different privacy unconcerns.

1. Introduction
Today, ubiquitous technologies spread rapidly in
different spheres of our lives. Even though the use of
these technologies is not forced on anybody, the shift
towards increased application of digital goods and new
trends appears omnipresent and somewhat inevitable.
The adoption of these new trends can be based on
genuine interest or gained benefits, but also on social
pressure or the need to belong. Depending on many
factors, the usage of these technologies might feel safe
and solely beneficial or it can be accompanied by uneasy
feeling, e.g., of being dependent, surveilled or, in
general, uncertain of the security of personal data
collected or generated with this technology. One good
example are the users of fitness tracking and similar
wearable technologies, who apply them while often
having many concerns about privacy risks. Still, in order
to profit from the (fitness and health) benefits, they need
to accept the challenges and threats. Data privacy and
security became one of the prominent concerns in this
area, especially since wearable technology encourages
collection, storage and sharing of health-related data,
which might be perceived as more sensitive than the
usual name-gender-age information, nowadays rather
willingly shared on many social networks.
Even though the fitness tracking tools give (health
and fitness-related) benefits to the consumers, they also
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pose new and partially unpredictable challenging threats
to data privacy and security. These threats exist due to
the possibility of ubiquitous collection of large amounts
of data in real time and creation of detailed user behavior
patterns, e.g., when people eat, sleep (and how good or
bad), exercise or go home from work [24]. The new
tracking devices and applications are collecting both,
personal information as well as health data, and create
“a quantified self for their users,” which becomes
especially risky when the companies (being in custody
of users’ data) might violate their privacy and misuse it
[22, 28:13].
Activity tracking technologies are collecting
different kinds of data (e.g., steps, heart rate, sleep
stages, geolocation), which might be considered to have
different degrees of sensitivity. This led Lidynia,
Brauner, and Ziefle [18] to investigate the users’
perceived sensitivity of different data types. They
online-surveyed 82 participants from Germany, where
46 participants were characterized as non-users of
wearables and 36 participants as wearable users. Their
results show that data types such as GPS, sleep analysis,
and weight are perceived as (rather) sensitive in
comparison to, for example, step count, hours spent
standing, and the number of climbed stairs. Lehto and
Lehto [17] investigated the user perception of privacy
and sensitivity of health information collected with
wearable devices as well as their willingness to share
such information with other parties. The participants of
their qualitative study “described the information
collected by their devices as not sensitive, not secret, not
confidential, and quite general” [17:247]. Even though
the collected information was not perceived as sensitive,
some interviewees expressed concerns when the data
should be connected with individual’s name and
address.
Previous studies showed that people are mainly
concerned about the collection of GPS data [16, 22, 23]
as well as data about their mood or stress level [23, 25]
and the detailed health information [23]. This topic
attracts attention also outside the scientific community.
For example, last year, The Guardian reported about the
case “Fitness tracking app Strava gives away location of
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secret US army bases” [15]. Even though this breach
was not concerning data collected by daily users or
runners, it again showed the sensitivity of information
pieces obtained through different fitness applications
and which potential risks might be lurking [15].
Although people seem to agree on sensitivity of location
or detailed health data, the users of fitness trackers do
not express one specific privacy concern about data
collection on their device, as it appears to change
depending on various factors [11, 16, 22, 30]. Lower
concerns or even unconcerns can be explained by the
lacking awareness of how users’ privacy can be
compromised due to collection of “granular data about
users over a long time” [30:230].
In order to identify how do former and current user
as well as non-users of fitness tracking applications
perceive sensitivity of several data types collected by
this technology, we formulate the first research question
(RQ1): What is the perceived sensitivity of different
data types by current users, former users, and non-users
of the fitness tracking applications?
Not without reason, many users of tracking apps
have concerns about privacy protection [20], third party
access to data [7], as well as access to personal
information by apps [4]. Still, even when users
understand and care about potential data privacy risks,
“they feel that once information is shared, it is
ultimately out of their control. They attribute this to the
opaque practices of institutions, the technological
affordances of social media, and the concept of
networked privacy, which acknowledges that
individuals exist in social contexts where others can and
do violate their privacy” [13:3738].
Fitness tracking technologies are popular not only
among the consumers, but also researchers on humancomputer interaction and health informatics. The
number of studies on activity tracking technologies
increased over the last years [27]. Recently, it focuses
more on the ubiquitous data collection and privacy [1,
5, 6, 24, 25]. Due to the “mobile and networked nature
of fitness trackers […] they automatically and
persistently collect data, which companies share with or
sell to third parties” [30:230]. Although seemingly
anonymous, the collected user data can be more easily
re-identified due to the increasing uniqueness of the
datasets [12, 24].
There is scientific interest in users’ behaviors when
sharing the so-called personal fitness information and
the privacy concerns coming from the collection,
aggregation, and sharing of these information pieces
[30:229]. How sensitive do people perceive their fitness
information to be? And what data privacy concerns do
they have? These questions are increasingly discussed
in context of the so-called privacy paradox [1, 3, 5],
meaning that even though users express some privacy

concerns, they “behave in ways that appear to
undermine their privacy” [30:230].
Based on the disagreement regarding what privacy
concerns about fitness tracking technology do users and
non-users indeed have, we formulated the second
research question (RQ2): What are the general privacy
concerns about fitness tracking by current users, former
users, and non-users of the fitness tracking applications?
Finally, previous research indicates that some users
apply fitness tracking applications to the fullest extent
even though they have data privacy-related concerns
(so-called privacy paradox). Also, there are users who
do not voice any specific concerns about the fitness
tracking technologies. Hence, there appear to exist
different groups of fitness tracking users when
considering the state of (perceived) data sensitivity and
security. This leads us to the final research question
(RQ3): What types of fitness tracking applications’
users can we distinguish based on their data privacy
concerns?

2. Methods
In order to collect suitable data for this study, an
online survey was conducted. This way it was possible
to reach as many participants from the European Union
and the USA as possible. The origin of fitness tracking
users can impact their attitude towards data privacy [2,
3, 21] and should be considered as an influencing factor
during the interpretation of the results; especially
considering the fundamentally different data protection
history and regulations in the USA and the EU [10]. The
survey targeted not only current users of fitness tracking
technologies, but also former users and non-users, who
also might have data privacy concerns.
The online survey started with questions about the
use of activity tracking applications and wearables, as
well as their usage frequency and duration. Inquired was
also the general opinion on (online) data privacy (“I am
not concerned about security on the Internet, e.g. people
finding out what websites I visit or getting to know my
real identity,” and “I do not care what companies whose
services or applications I use do with my (personal)
data”), which could be valued on a 5-point Likert scale.
These questions provided data to include further factors
possibly influencing privacy-related concerns about
fitness tracking applications as well as the perceived
sensitivity of data pieces collected by fitness tracking
technology.
Seven items were formulated to inquire participants’
data privacy-related concerns about fitness tracking
applications (e.g., misuse of data by the company). The
questions could also be answered on a 5-point Likert
scale. Five of the seven items were adopted from
Lidynia, Schomakers, and Ziefle [19], who among
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others investigated the data privacy concerns of fitness
tracking users and non-users in Germany. The other two
items were added based on the research about
involvement of heath insurances and possible third
parties inferences [14, 17, 26]. All three types of
participants (users, former users, and non-users of
activity tracking applications) had to answer those
questions.
In order to measure the perceived sensitivity of
different data types, the following data pieces were
adopted from the work by Lidynia, Brauner, and Ziefle
[18:45]: “Step count,” “Pulse,”* “GPS,”* “Calories,”*
“Blood pressure,” “Stairs,”* “Standing hours,” “Sleep
analysis,”* “BMI,”* “Blood sugar,” and “Weight.” Data
pieces marked with “*” were labeled differently than in
research by Lidynia, Brauner, and Ziefle [18] in order to
clarify the meaning of the data pieces to the survey
participants. Considering the functionalities of activity
tracking technologies, further data pieces were added:
menstrual cycle, completed workouts, fitness
level/experience points, trophies, badges, lost and won
challenges, real name, gender, birthday, e-mail,
contacts/friends, and joined groups. All in all, the survey
included 23 data pieces, which had to be assessed by all
three groups of participants. The data pieces were
grouped into the categories: personal data, healthrelated data, activity data and progress data. The rating
scale for each data piece ranged from “1—not sensitive
at all. I would make it public” to “5—Very sensitive. I
don’t want anyone to know it.” Here, also the answer
possibility “I don’t know what it is” (especially for nonusers) or “Not applicable” (e.g., information piece being
“menstrual cycle” had to be answered by male
participants) were included.
The survey was pretested by six participants, two
non-users and four current or former users of activity
tracking technologies. Three pretesters were males and
three were females. After the pretest was concluded, the
survey was slightly modified in regard to language (e.g.,
statements formulated more objectively), clarification
of any ambiguities, adding of open questions for further
remarks, and making the survey more user-friendly by
different positioning and segmentation of the questions.
The online survey was non-probabilistically
distributed from February 26, 2019, until May 28, 2019.
It was spread through different social media channels,
both private profiles and social media groups (e.g.,
Facebook, Reddit, Twitter, or Xing), scientific
communities (ASIS&T), or portals for survey sharing
(SurveyCircle, SurveyTandem).
The collected data was cleaned—incomplete
answers and answers provided by pretesters were
excluded, and the data was recoded into numerical
values with the Syntax of IBM SPSS Statistics 25. The

data collected from answers marked on the Likert scale
was handled as ordinal.
In order to answer the first two research questions,
the Kruskal-Wallis H Test and a subsequent post-hoc
test were conducted to investigate the differences in
perceived data sensitivity and data privacy concerns
between three groups of participants (users, non-users,
and former users of fitness tracking applications).
Kruskal-Wallis H Test is a rank-based nonparametric
test used to determine if there are statistically significant
differences between two or more groups of an
independent variable on a continuous or ordinal
dependent variable [29]. It is adequate for our approach
and collected data since the dependent variables
(perceived data sensitivity and data privacy concerns)
are measured on an ordinal scale. In order to determine
which group(s) exactly are different from which other
group(s), a post-hoc test—all pairwise comparisons
using Dunn's [8] procedure with a Bonferroni
adjustment, was conducted [29].
In order to determine the characteristics of possible
subgroups of fitness tracking applications’ users based
on their perceived data sensitivity as well as data privacy
concerns, the K-means clustering procedure was
conducted. The K-means clustering algorithm was run
for a range of K values in order to determine the most
suitable one. Since the scale of the included ordinal
variables ranges only from 1 to 5, the most distinctive
group differences were given for K=3.

3. Results
Out of 777 online survey participants, 649
completed the survey (83.53%). Only participants who
stated to be from the USA or the EU (N=590) were
included in further analysis. The origin of fitness
tracking users was considered as possibly influencing
factor during the interpretation of the results.
The descriptive information about the sample is
listed in Table 1. The distribution by gender is almost
balanced (with 56% female participants). The survey
addressed not only users of fitness tracking applications
(55.9%), but also former users (9%) and non-users
(35%). The age distribution is satisfactory, since both,
elderly (over 60) and young adults (up to 23 years old),
are represented within the sample. The participants of
the survey had to indicate their year of birth. For further
analysis a categorization into four generations, based on
research on inter-generational differences in digital
media usage [9, 10], was conducted. The four
generations include: Silver Surfers (born before 1959,
hence at least 60 years old), Gen X (or Digital
Immigrants, born between 1960 and 1979, hence 40-59
years old), Gen Y (also Digital Natives or Millennials,
born between 1980 and 1995; between 24 and 39 years
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old), and finally, Gen Z (born after 1996, hence, up to
23 years old).
Table 1. Demographic information (N=590).
Origin
Gender

EU
USA

Freq.

%

477
113

80.8%
19.2%

Female
331
Male
253
Other
6
Fitness Tracking Application
Current Users
330
Non-Users
207
Former Users
53
Generation
Silver Surfers
55
Gen X
115
Gen Y
327
Gen Z
93

56.1%
42.9%
1.0%
55.9%
35.1%
9.0%
9.3%
19.5%
55.4%
15.8%

The inclusion of non-users in the survey gives us a
third perspective on the perceived data sensitivity and
data privacy concerns with regard to fitness tracking.
However, their answers can be influenced by further
factors like inexperience with fitness tracking or
disinterest in fitness activity in general. The possible
distortion of the results by non-users’ lacking
knowledge about different data pieces etc. was
minimized by inclusion of the answer possibility “I
don’t know”.
In order to verify, if the participating non-users are
at all physically active, which might have an influence
on their attitude towards fitness tracking in general, the
Kruskal-Wallis H Test was conducted to determine any
significant differences between users, non-users, and
former users regarding their “daily activity level” (from
“predominantly not active, e.g., due to an office job,” to
“highly active”) and their fitness or exercise intensity.
As for the daily activity level (ranging from 1 to 5), the
median equals 3 (“moderately active”) for all three
groups, there is, however, a significant difference in the
distribution
between
current
users
(Mean
Rank = 317.10) and non-users (Mean Rank = 263.31),
H(2) = 14.058, p = .001. As for the question about how
often do the participants exercise (frequency ranging
from 1 to 8), the differences in medians are rather small.
For current users the median equals 7 (“exercising 3 or
more times per week”), whereas for former users and
non-users the median equals 6 (“exercising 1-2 times
per week”). There are, however, significant differences
in the distributions, H(2) = 36.268, p < .001, between
current users (Mean Rank = 327.70) and non-users
(Mean Rank = 240.20) (p < .001) as well as between

former users (Mean Rank = 310.98) and non-users (p =
.016). Even though there are significant differences in
fitness or exercise activity, on average the non-users of
fitness tracking technologies are still quite active
(exercising 1-2 times per week), which indicates a
general interest in fitness (just not fitness tracking).

3.1. Perceived data sensitivity (RQ1)

The first research question concerns the differences
in perceived data sensitivity by users, non-users, and
former users of the fitness tracking applications. The
results of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test for perceived
sensitivity of “personal data” (Table 2) indicates
significant differences in distributions for only two data
pieces— “gender” and “interest groups.” A post-hoc test
revealed statistically significant differences between
users and non-users in both cases. When looking at the
mean perceived sensitivity values for all groups
(medians), there are barely any differences, except for
“gender.” The users and former users perceive those
pieces of information as rather not sensitive, whereas
non-users perceive them as neutral.
There are more significant differences in the
distribution of the perceived sensitivity of health-related
data (continued in Table 2). Except for the information
about “menstrual cycle” (sensitive for all three groups),
the perceived sensitivity of all remaining information
pieces is different between users and non-users.
Moreover, there is a significant difference between
former users and non-users for the data pieces “heart
rate” and “sleeping times.” When considering the mean
perceived sensitivity, the non-users valued “calories
intake” and “heart rate” higher than former and current
users, who perceive them as neutral. Interestingly,
current users and non-users perceive “blood pressure”
and “sleeping times” as rather sensitive, whereas the
former users have a neutral attitude towards them.
Regarding the activity and progress data, all three
groups agree on high sensitivity of GPS data (median of
5 for all groups, no significant differences in
distribution). For the remaining data pieces, there are
significant differences between users and non-users, and
additionally between former users and non-users for the
information about “step count.” Except for GPS data,
users and former users perceive all remaining activity
and progress data as neutral (median of 3). Non-users
also perceive most of the data pieces as neutral, except
for the “step count” (interestingly seen as very sensitive,
median equals 5), “fitness level or experience points” as
well as “lost challenges” (rather sensitive, median
equals 4). Interestingly, even though non-users perceive
the information about “lost challenges” as rather
sensitive, their perception of the information about
“won challenges” is neutral (median equals 3).
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Table 2. Differences in perceived sensitivity of different data pieces by mean ranks (MR) and medians (Mdn).

Real
name

Health-related data

Personal data

Gender
Birthday
E-Mail
Contacts/
friends
Interest
groups
Calories
intake
Burned
calories
Heart
rate
Blood
pressure
Sleeping
times
BMI
Weight
Menstrual
cycle
Step
count

Activity & progress data

GPS
Climbed
stairs
Standing
hours
Completed
workouts
Fitness level,
XPs
Trophies,
badges
Lost
challenges
Won
challenges

MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn

Users
(Y)
277.53
4 (n=325)
274.20
2 (n=327)
281.14
4 (n=328)
296.76
4 (n=327)
280.29
5 (n=327)
274.66
4 (n=329)
270.88
3 (n=322)
269.87
3 (n=327)
278.19
3 (n=327)
275.28
4 (n=325)
280.13
4 (n=326)
274.76
4 (n=327)
274.02
4 (n=328)
216.72
5 (n=244)
209.15
3 (n=329)
281.70
5 (n=327)
265.09
3 (n=327)
268.89
3 (n=325)
262.61
3 (n=325)
260.09
3 (n=320)
261.86
3 (n=324)
251.02
3 (n=315)
256.40
3 (n=315)

Non-Users
(N)
312.17
4 (n=202)
322.87
3 (n=203)
310.42
4 (n=202)
280.21
4 (n=202)
306.20
5 (n=202)
320.44
4 (n=202)
324.52
4 (n=205)
331.45
3 (n=205)
322.67
4 (n=203)
320.23
4 (n=202)
321.51
4 (n=205)
320.40
4 (n=205)
319.67
4 (n=205)
241.01
5 (n=159)
404.51
5 (n=159)
305.09
5 (n=202)
335.07
3 (n=205)
325.82
3 (n=204)
337.80
3 (n=205)
325.45
4 (n=196)
326.45
3 (n=194)
333.41
4 (n=195)
324.08
3 (n=195)

3.2. Data privacy-related concerns about fitness
tracking applications (RQ2)
The second research question addresses differences
in data privacy-related concerns (Table 3) about fitness

Former
Users (F)
287.42
4 (n=53)
277.81
2.5 (n=52)
283.34
4 (n=52)
302.07
4 (n=53)
304.64
5 (n=53)
296.75
4 (n=53)
278.09
3 (n=53)
287.00
3 (n=53)
259.78
3 (n=53)
270.50
3 (n=53)
256.34
3 (n=53)
299.55
4 (n=53)
312.81
4 (n=53)
208.37
4 (n=45)
254.40
3 (n=53)
300.15
5 (n=53)
302.46
3 (n=53)
298.01
3 (n=53)
295.08
3 (n=53)
285.78
3 (n=53)
285.54
3 (n=53)
277.01
3 (n=53)
279.34
3 (n=53)

KruskalWallis H Test
H(2) = 5.714
p = .057
H(2) = 11.621
p = .003
H(2) = 4.272
p = .118
H(2) = 1.660
p = .436
H(2) = 4.264
p = .119
H(2) = 10.042
p = .007
H(2) = 13.835
p = .001
H(2) = 17.662
p < .001
H(2) = 11.496
p = .003
H(2) = 10.384
p = .006
H(2) = 11.084
p = .004
H(2) = 9.966
p = .007
H(2) = 10.686
p = .005
H(2) = 5.113
p = .078
H(2) = 175.95
p < .001
H(2) = 3.584
p = .167
H(2) = 23.264
p < .001
H(2) = 15.446
p < .001
H(2) = 26.553
p < .001
H(2) = 20.278
p < .001
H(2) = 19.645
p < .001
H(2) = 32.779
p < .001
H(2) = 22.092
p < .001

Post-Hoc
Test
Y- N p = .002
Y - N p = .005
Y - N p = .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p = .028
F - N p = .038
Y - N p = .006
Y - N p = .013
F - N p = .027
Y - N p = .005
Y - N p = .005
Y - N p < .001
F - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001
Y - N p < .001

tracking applications between current users, former
users, and non-users of fitness tracking applications.
The Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed significant
differences in distribution between some of the groups
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for all concerns, except for “health insurances will
access my data and use it against me.” For the remaining
concerns there are significant differences in
distributions for former users and non-users and
additionally between current users and former users (for
the concerns that “collected data is too sensitive” and
“the app companies will forward my personal data to
third parties”). Interestingly, the former users seem less

concerned about the listed aspects and see most of them
as neutral (median equals 3), except for the concern that
“it will be possible to create an exact profile of my
movements, habits or preferences,” which they slightly
agree with (median equals 4). The users and non-users
on average agree with all the statements (median equals
4).

Table 3. Differences in data privacy concerns about fitness tracking by mean ranks (MR) and medians (Mdn).
Concerns about fitness tracking
applications
Collected data is too sensitive.
The app companies will forward
my personal data to third parties.
Health insurances will access my
data and use it against me.
The app companies will misuse
my data.
I have no control over what will
happen to my data.
It will be possible to create an
exact profile of my movements,
habits or preferences.
There will be interference risks
from hackers and other
unauthorized parties.

MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn
MR
Mdn

Users
(Y)
285.26
4 (n=323)
286.49
4 (n=320)
280.26
4 (n=322)
273.73
4 (n=318)
280.19
4 (n=322)

Non-Users
(N)
303.99
4 (n=194)
292.76
4 (n=196)
292.55
4 (n=193)
300.64
4 (n=194)
306.82
4 (n=197)

Former
Users (F)
212.51
3 (n=52)
221.19
3 (n=49)
251.21
3 (n=48)
243.96
3 (n=48)
230.01
3 (n=50)

KruskalWallis H Test
H(2) = 13.528
p = .001
H(2) = 8.558
p = .014
H(2) = 2.713
p = .258
H(2) = 6.428
p = .040
H(2) = 10.022
p = .007

MR
Mdn

282.35
4 (n=322)

299.05
4 (n=195)

235.90
4 (n=50)

H(2) = 6.585
p = .037

N - F p = .032

MR
Mdn

284.66
4 (n=320)

292.13
4 (n=194)

231.32
3 (n=50)

H(2) = 6.113
p = .047

N - F p = .044

3.3. Fitness tracking user types by privacy
concerns (RQ3)
The final research question concerns identifying and
characterizing subgroups of fitness tracking
applications’ users based on their perceived sensitivity
of different data pieces and privacy concerns.
The K-means cluster analysis with K1=3 revealed
three very distinctive groups of users. For better
identification of data privacy concerns, the medians for
each cluster and data piece were aggregated into groups
of perception as “sensitive” (for medians equaling 4 or
5), “neutral” (median equaling 3) and “not sensitive”
(medians equaling 1 or 2), see Table 4.
The first cluster (CL1, with 64 users) includes users
that can be described as rather cautious about data
sensitivity, since except for “gender” (perceived as
neutral), all remaining data pieces are regarded as
sensitive. A more detailed differentiation between
“sensitive” and “very sensitive” perception of data
pieces can be gathered from Table 5. Here, we can see
that for CL1, the most sensitive data pieces are “contacts
/friends,” most of the health-related data pieces, and the
GPS location.

Post-Hoc
Test
Y - F p = .007
N - F p = .001
Y - F p = .020
N - F p = .013
N - F p = .074
N - F p = .007

The second cluster (CL2, with 120 users) can be
described as rather neutral or balanced in the valuation
of the data pieces. Here, eleven of the data pieces
(personal and health-related information) is perceived as
sensitive (however, only “GPS” is valued as “very
sensitive” (Table 5)). Most of the activity and progress
data is perceived as neutral. The “not sensitive”
information pieces are gender, step count, and climbed
stairs.
Finally, the third cluster (CL3, with 43 users) can be
described as rather indifferent or unconcerned about the
different data pieces. The only sensitive data seem to be
the “e-mail,” “contacts/friends,” and the “GPS” location
(however, none of them are perceived as “very
sensitive”). The data pieces “real name,” “birthday,”
“interest groups,” and “menstrual cycle” are perceived
as neutral, whereas others are seen as “not sensitive.”
In order to detect further differences between the
three clusters that could influence the perceived data
sensitivity, the cluster membership of each case was
saved into a new variable and the Kruskal-Wallis H Test
was conducted for these subgroups of fitness tracking
applications’ users. Several factors, e.g., fitness level or
origin, were investigated.
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CL1 (n=64)
Real name, Birthday, E-Mail,
Contacts/friends, Interest groups,
Calories (burned/intake), HR, BP,
Sleeping times, BMI, Weight,
Menstrual cycle, Step count, GPS,
Climbed stairs, Standing hours,
Completed workouts, Fitness level
or XPs, Trophies or badges, Lost
challenges, Won challenges

Neutral

Sensitive

Table 4. Results of K-means clustering procedure on perceived data sensitivity, grouped into perception as “not
sensitive” (1-2), “neutral” (3) and “sensitive” (4-5). Abbreviations: Blood Pressure (BP), Heart Rate (HR).

Not sensitive

Gender

CL2 (n=120)

Birthday, E-Mail, Contacts/friends,
Interest groups,
HR, BP, Sleeping times, BMI,
Weight, Menstrual cycle, GPS

E-Mail, Contacts/friends, GPS

Real name, Calories
(burned/intake), Standing hours,
Completed workouts, Fitness level
or XPs, Trophies or badges, Lost
challenges, Won challenges

Real name, Birthday, Interest
groups, Menstrual cycle

Gender, Step
Count, Climbed stairs

Gender, Calories (burned/intake),
HR, BP, Sleeping times, BMI,
Weight, Step count, Climbed stairs,
Standing hours, Completed
workouts, Fitness level or XPs,
Trophies or badges, Lost
challenges, Won challenges

Table 5. Results of K-means clustering procedure on
perceived data sensitivity (scale from 1 to 5).

Activity & progress
data

Health-related
data

Personal
data

Data Pieces
Real name
Gender
Birthday
E-Mail
Contacts/Friends
Interest groups
Calories intake
Burned calories
Heart rate
Blood pressure
Sleeping times
BMI
Weight
Menstrual cycle
Step count
GPS
Climbed stairs
Standing hours
Workouts
Fitness level, XPs
Trophies, badges
Lost challenges
Won challenges

CL1
N=64
4
3
4
4
5
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

CL3 (n=43)

CL2
N=120
3
2
4
4
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
5
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

CL3
N=43
3
2
3
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Indeed, the Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed
significant differences in distribution between the three
clusters (CL1-CL3) for the fitness or exercise activity
(ranging from 1 to 8), H(2) = 10.628, p = .005; CL1
(Mean Rank = 93.8; Median = 6), CL2 (Mean
Rank = 118.20; Median = 6.5) and CL3 (Mean
Rank = 132.33; Median = 7). According to the post-hoc
test, the significant differences are given between CL1
and CL2 (p = .039) and between CL1 and CL3
(p = .006).
Further significant differences in distribution
between the three clusters are given for the general
attitude towards online privacy, namely “I am not
concerned about security on the internet, e.g. people
finding out what websites I visit or getting to know my
real identity” (answered on a 5-point Likert scale), H(2)
= 6.069, p = .048; CL1 (Mean Rank = 99.77;
Median = 2), CL2 (Mean Rank = 115.92; Median = 2)
and CL3 (Mean Rank = 129.81; Median = 3). There was
only one significant difference between CL1 and CL3
(p = .047).
The last significant difference in distributions was
given for the general opinion on online privacy: “I do
not care what companies whose services or applications
I use do with my (personal) data” H(2) = 19.326, p <
.001; CL1 (Mean Rank = 89.20; Median = 1), CL2
(Mean Rank = 116.79; Median = 2), CL3 (Mean
Rank = 141.12;
Median = 2).
The
significant
differences were given between CL1 and CL2 (p = .010)
and between CL1 and CL3 (p < .001).
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According to the Kruskal-Wallis H Test, there were
no significant differences between the three clusters
regarding the everyday activity level, the usage
frequency as well as usage duration of the fitness
tracking application, and the age of the participants. In
order to detect possible cultural differences in cluster
membership between participants from the EU and from
the USA, the Pearson Chi2 was calculated. However,
there were no significant differences between
participants from these two regions.
The first three clusters were estimated based on the
users’ perceived sensitivity of different data pieces.
Another three clusters (CL4-CL6) were calculated
based on the data privacy-related concerns regarding
fitness tracking applications (Table 6). Here, the CL4
(n=104) includes users agreeing with the most concerns.
Except for the one: “collected data is too sensitive,” they
highly agree with all the remaining statements (median
equals 5). The next cluster, CL5 (n=63), includes rather
unconcerned users. They do not agree with the most
statements and are neutral (median equals 3) with
concerns about the collected data being too sensitive as
well as the statement “it will be possible to create an
exact profile of my movements, habits or preferences.”
Finally, the last cluster, CL6 (n=137), consists of users
having slight concerns. They somewhat agree with most
of the statements, except for the two about the collected
data being too sensitive and the one stating that “health
insurances will access my data and use it against me,”
towards
which
they
have
a
neutral attitude (median equals 3).

Similar to the first three clusters, the Kruskal-Wallis
H Test was conducted for the Clusters CL4-CL6. The
results show that there are significant differences in
distribution between the clusters for general online
privacy concerns, namely the statement “I am not
concerned about security on the Internet”: H(2) =
31.151, p < .001; CL4 (Mean Rank = 118.11;
Median = 2), CL5 (Mean Rank = 189.06; Median = 3),
and CL6 (Mean Rank = 161.80; Median = 2). The posthoc test revealed significant differences between CL4
and CL5 (p < .001) and between CL4 and CL6
(p < .001).
There are also significant differences in the
agreement with the statement “I do not care what
companies whose services or applications I use do with
my personal data,” H(2) = 34.248, p < .001; CL4
(Mean Rank = 119.70; Median = 1), CL5 (Mean
and
CL6
(Mean
Rank = 195.15; Median = 2)
Rank = 157.78; Median = 2). According to the post-hoc
test, the significant differences are given between all
clusters: CL4 and CL6 (p = .001), CL4 and CL5
(p < .001), and CL6 and CL5 (p = .008).
The tests revealed no significant differences
between the clusters for the everyday activity level, the
fitness or exercise level, the usage frequency and usage
duration of the fitness tracking application as well as the
age of the user. Furthermore, according to Pearson Chi2,
there were no significant differences in cluster
distributions between users from the EU and the USA.

Table 6. Results of K-means clustering procedure on data privacy-related concerns regarding fitness tracking
applications (scale from 1 to 5).
Concerns
Collected data is too sensitive.
The app companies will forward my personal data to third parties.
Health insurances will access my data and use it against me.
The app companies will misuse my data.
I have no control over what will happen to my data.
It will be possible to create an exact profile of my movements, habits or preferences.
There will be interference risks from hackers and other unauthorized parties.

4. Discussion
How do different groups of participants perceive the
sensitivity of various data pieces collected by fitness
tracking technologies? And what specific privacy
concerns do they have, when thinking about this
technology? When comparing current users, former
users, and non-users of fitness tracking applications,
there are only two significant differences between users
and non-users in perception of “personal

CL4
(n=104)
4
5
5
5
5
5
5

CL5
(n=63)
3
2
2
2
2
3
2

CL6
(n=137)
3
4
3
4
4
4
4

information”—the sensitivity of “gender” (perceived as
neutral or not sensitive) and “interest groups.” All other
personal data pieces were perceived as at least sensitive
by all groups.
More significant differences were given for healthrelated data. All groups agreed on the sensitivity of
information about “menstrual cycle.” All remaining
information pieces were perceived differently between
users and non-users. In general, current users perceive
calories (“burned” or “intake”) and “heart rate” as
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neutral, and the remaining data pieces as sensitive. The
non-users perceive only “burned calories” as neutral and
rest as sensitive. Finally, the former users only perceive
information about “BMI,” “weight,” and “menstrual
cycle” as sensitive.
Regarding the activity and progress data, all three
groups agree on high sensitivity of “GPS,” which
confirms the results by Lidynia et al. [19]. Except for
“GPS,” users and former users perceive all remaining
activity and progress data as neutral. Non-users perceive
most of the data pieces as neutral, except for “step
count” (very sensitive), “fitness level or experience
points,” and “lost challenges” (rather sensitive). Even
though they perceive “lost challenges” as rather
sensitive information, their perception of the
information about “won challenges” is neutral.
The second research question addressed the data
privacy-related concerns about fitness tracking
applications. There were no significant differences in
distribution between the three groups for the statement
“health insurances will access my data and use it against
me.” In general, the former users seem less concerned
about the aspects and see most of them as neutral, except
for the concern that “it will be possible to create an exact
profile of my movements, habits or preferences,” which
they slightly agree with. The users and non-users on
average agree with all the statements. Here, an
interesting question arises, why the former users
stopped using these applications or wearables and
whether any privacy-related concerns played a role.
Since users in this investigation still appear to have
some reservations about data privacy, but continue
using the fitness tracking technologies, it might not be a
key aspect, when making a decision to stop or continue
using the technology.
The third research question regarded potential
subgroups of fitness tracking applications’ users based
on their (a) perceived data sensitivity and (b) data
privacy-related concerns about fitness tracking
applications. The first K-means clustering procedure
(K1=3) yield three distinctive subgroups of users: CL1
(concerned users, n=64), CL2 (neutral users, n=120),
and CL3 (unconcerned users, n=43). The concerned
users indeed perceive all data pieces as (very) sensitive,
except for “gender” (neutral). The neutral users are
more balanced in their perception, as only “GPS” was
perceived by them as “very sensitive,” whereas 11 data
pieces (personal and health-related information) as
“sensitive.” They perceive most of the activity and
progress data as neutral and information like “gender,”
“step count,” and “climbed stairs” as “not sensitive.”
Finally, the unconcerned users do not perceive any of
the information pieces as “very sensitive,” and valued
only three data pieces (“e-mail,” “contacts/friends,” and
“GPS”) as “sensitive” and four data pieces (“real name,”

“birthday,” “interest groups,” and “menstrual cycle”) as
“neutral.” They perceive the remaining information as
“not sensitive.” The differences between these three
clusters are not limited to the perceived data sensitivity.
Subsequent Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed that the
unconcerned users are on average the most active ones
(regarding “fitness or exercise” activity), followed by
neutral users. It could also mean that users of activity
tracking technologies, who are very active, might not
fear the “publicity” of the collected data that supports
their healthy lifestyle. As one would probably expect,
users who are generally doubtful about data privacy
online, are also more concerned about the sensitivity of
different data pieces. Their perceived sensitivity of data
might be this high due to (perceived) lack of safe (data)
environment, where personal data is protected from
hackers and other misuse, and due to very limited (or
non-existent) trust in the companies who have custody
of the data. For example, the concerned users tend to
disagree more with the statement “I am not concerned
about security on the internet” than the unconcerned
users (who are rather neutral towards it). Furthermore,
the concerned users tend to strongly disagree with the
statement “I do not care what companies whose services
or applications I use do with my (personal) data,”
whereas neutral users and unconcerned users only
somewhat disagree. Interestingly, there are no
significant differences between the three user groups
regarding age as well as the usage duration and usage
frequency of the fitness tracking application. Finally,
there was no significant association between the cluster
membership and the origin of the users.
The second clustering procedure (K2=3) involved
users’ data privacy-related concerns about fitness
tracking applications. The identified subgroups include:
highly concerned users (CL4, n=104, strongly agreeing
with almost all statements), unconcerned users (CL5,
n=63, not agreeing with most of the statement or being
neutral), and slightly concerned users (CL6, n=137,
somewhat agreeing with most of the statements).
Further differences between these three subgroups
regarded the general online privacy concerns, which
were again higher for the cluster with highly concerned
users. Interestingly, there were no significant
differences between the clusters regarding the usage
frequency and usage duration of the fitness tracking
application, the age of the user as well as for the
everyday activity and the fitness or exercise level. There
were also no significant differences in distributions
between users from the EU and the USA, indicating a
rather similar distribution of data related unconcerns
between users from these two regions.
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